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Abstract 
Myopic loss aversion was suggested by Benartzi and Thaler (1995) as an explanation for the 
equity premium puzzle. Its main prediction is that loss averse investors, who evaluate their 
investment performance too frequently and therefore often observe small losses on their stock 
portfolios, would invest too little in equity. We investigate the link between myopic loss 
aversion and actual investment decisions of individual investors, using survey data. Our 
results are consistent with the predictions of Benartzi and Thaler. Higher myopic loss aversion 
is associated with lower stock investment as a share of total assets. Investors tend to evaluate 
their stock portfolio performance too often, which contributes to the prevalence of myopic 
loss aversion. The effect of myopia is most apparent when investors both evaluate their 
portfolios frequently and trade stocks regularly. 
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1. Introduction  
 
The equity premium puzzle of Mehra and Prescott (1985) highlights the abnormally high 
difference between the returns on the S&P 500 and risk-free Treasury bills observed between 
1889 and 1978. Unless investors have implausibly high levels of risk aversion, the historical 
average equity premium of 6% is too high to be justified by standard economic models. 
Responding to this puzzle, Benartzi and Thaler (1995) propose the concept of myopic loss 
aversion (MLA), which describes the tendency of loss-averse investors to evaluate their 
portfolios too frequently and consequently to invest too little in risky assets 1 . Using 
simulations, Benartzi and Thaler demonstrate that when investors evaluate their portfolios 
annually, the size of the equity premium is consistent with parameters estimated in prospect 
theory (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992)2. Thaler et al. (1997), Gneezy and Potters (1997), 
Haigh and List (2005), and Eriksen and Kvaløy (2010) support the existence of MLA in 
experimental settings, finding that when portfolio evaluation or rebalancing frequency is 
reduced, subjects increase their investment in risky assets. 
Most previous studies on MLA are experimental and use students as subjects for 
investment allocation simulations,3 which means that we do not know with certainty whether 
these results reflect the real-life decision-making of investors. We fill this gap by surveying a 
representative cross-section of individuals, and testing whether their MLA is correlated with 
their actual equity investment.  
We explicitly account for the joint effects of myopia and loss aversion, rather than 
merely studying them in isolation. Following Benartzi and Thaler (1995), we define MLA as 
                                            
1
 A related, and more theoretically tractable, alternative to MLA is the Disappointment Aversion framework of 
Gul (1991). Its application to the portfolio choice problem is extensively discussed by Ang, Bekaert and Liu 
(2005). 
2
 However, Ang, Bekaert and Liu (2005) show that the optimal asset allocation solution found by Benartzi and 
Thaler is limited to the no-borrowing (and no-short-selling) case, and that no finite solution exists in the general 
case. If leverage is not restricted, the loss averse investor’s utility is maximized when equity investment 
approaches infinity.  
3
 Exceptions are Haigh and List (2005) and Eriksen and Kvaløy (2010), who conduct their experiments with 
professional traders. 
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a combination of individual investors’ levels of myopia and loss aversion. Examining these 
two effects together is important because the fundamental concept of MLA is built on their 
interaction. To the best of our knowledge, our study is the first empirical study of MLA to 
focus on the relationship between both investors’ myopia and loss aversion and their equity 
investments. Dimmock and Kouwenberg (2010) also analyse the investment decisions of 
individual investors with real-life data, but focus exclusively on loss aversion as an 
explanation for household portfolio choice. They do not address the effects of investors’ 
myopia or MLA. Kliger and Levit (2009) focus on the market return and volatility of a small 
number of stocks that have their trading frequency changed by the stock exchange. While 
their results are supportive of the MLA hypothesis, their data does not include the majority of 
the traded stocks, making these results difficult to extend to full investors’ portfolios.  
The concept of myopia was originally developed on the basis of portfolio evaluation 
frequency only. Gneezy, Kapteyn, and Potters (2003), however, suggest rebalancing 
frequency as another important proxy for myopia. Subsequent experimental studies have 
attempted to disentangle the effects of evaluation and rebalancing frequencies, although 
findings conflict to some extent. Bellemare et al. (2005) argue that evaluation frequency alone 
determines myopia, while Langer and Weber (2008) find that rebalancing frequency is the 
sole driving force. Fellner and Sutter (2009) conclude that both variables contribute to the 
effects of myopia. They demonstrate in a multi-period experimental setting that subjects have 
a clear preference for more frequent evaluation and rebalancing. To measure myopia, we 
survey investors on both their evaluation and rebalancing frequencies.  
We investigate the link between MLA and the share of investors’ total financial assets 
invested in equity, as well as yearly changes in equity allocation over our sample period. We 
find that the level of MLA is negatively correlated with the proportion of individual portfolios 
invested in equities. Among highly loss averse individuals, high levels of both evaluation and 
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rebalancing frequencies are associated with a relatively low equity holding. This result is 
driven by both loss aversion and myopia and is consistent with the main predictions of 
Benartzi and Thaler (1995).  
Our evidence also suggests that the simulations results of Benartzi and Thaler (1995) 
are based on plausible assumptions, with the median investor in our sample evaluating her 
investment results quarterly and rebalancing her portfolio less than once a year. This result is 
in line with the experiment of Fellner and Sutter (2009), who find that most subjects display a 
strong preference for a high evaluation frequency and a somewhat less pronounced preference 
for short investment horizons.  
When we investigate changes in the proportion of equity investments, the effect of 
myopia on investors’ decisions dominates that of loss aversion. Investors, who evaluate their 
holdings less frequently, increase their holdings over time more than those who check their 
performance at least monthly. This result is robust to controlling for changes in the level of 
investments due to stock market fluctuations.  
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we explain our survey 
data collection procedure and the construction of variables. In Section 3 we present our 
models and empirical results. Finally, we summarise and conclude our study in Section 4. 
 
2. Data Description and Construction of Variables 
 
Sample Selection  
 
We use the survey data from the CentERdata, a specialised online research institute at 
Tilburg University in the Netherlands. It consists of over 2,000 households including 
individuals over 16 years of age and representative of the Dutch population in respect of a 
number of important demographic characteristics. This panel has been used extensively in 
academic research; for instance, Van Rooij, Lusardi, and Alessie (2011; 2012) use it to study 
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the effects of financial literacy on individual stock market participation and wealth, Dong, 
Robinson, and Veld (2005) study the preferences of individual investors on dividend 
payments, and Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2008) investigate the relationship between trust 
and stock market participation.  
In 2003, we submitted a survey on MLA to the CentERdata panel and 2,226 panel 
members participated 4 . Since the survey focused on investors’ portfolio evaluation and 
rebalancing frequencies, it was addressed only to those who invest in equities (stocks and 
mutual funds). 5  From those 2,226 individuals, we obtain responses from 687 investors, 
indicating that about 30% of the contacted panel members are investors. This percentage is 
comparable to the equity ownership rates in the Netherlands reported by Alessie, Hochguertel, 
and van Soest (2004), and Dimmock and Kouwenberg (2010). We combine the survey on 
MLA with the Dutch National Bank Household survey (DHS) which includes extensive 
financial, demographic and psychological information. The DHS survey has been undertaken 
annually by the panel since 1993. We first merge the MLA survey with intertemporal choice 
questions from the Economics and Psychological Concepts section of the DHS, which 
enables us to estimate individuals’ loss aversion and discount rates. These questions are only 
available for the period 1997-2002. Due to the unavailability of these questions after 2002, 
there are a large number of missing values reducing the sample size to 407. We further 
incorporate the time preference question from the DHS for the year 2003; for the resulting 
additional 5% of missing values, we impute values reported for the time preference question 
in the years 2002 and/or 2004 for the same individuals, although these data are missing for 4 
individuals. Finally, we merge our dataset with the assets and liabilities section of the DHS 
for the period 1997 (the first year for which the intertemporal questions are available) to 2010, 
                                            
4
 As this survey was conducted only once, we cannot test for the variations in the levels of myopia over time, and 
we carry out our tests under the assumption that individuals’ MLA remains constant. 
5
 In this paper, we investigate the relationship between the effects of myopic loss aversion and individual 
investors’ portfolio allocation decisions in accordance with the theory suggested by Benartzi and Thaler (1995). 
Thus the question of what determines stock market participation falls outwith the scope of the study. 
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making 14 years of asset allocation data in total. We lose a further 3 individuals who fail to 
report their assets and liabilities throughout the period. Panel A of Table 1 presents our 
sample selection process and Panel B shows the demographic characteristics of our sample in 
2003.  
[Table 1 here] 
Our unbalanced panel includes 400 individuals who appear on average for 8 years, 
making a total of 3,347 observations for the period from 1997 to 2010. 70% are men and 30% 
are women. Their ages range from 20 to 88, with an average age of 52. About 80% are 
married, and 57% have either a college or university education. Our sample, which includes 
investors only, is more representative of actual stock market investors than of general 
population, thus biased towards older, married and better-educated male respondents.  
Financial Variables  
 
We incorporate the aggregated assets and liabilities values from the annual DHS for 
the period 1997 to 2010. All financial values are as at 31st December of the preceding year. 
We winsorise all financial variables by replacing all observations in the top percentile at the 
value of the 99th percentile. Following Alessie, Hochguertel, and van Soest (2002), we define 
Total financial assets as the sum of positive balances on Checking accounts, Employer 
sponsored savings plans, 6  Savings accounts, Deposit books, Savings certificate, Single-
premium annuity insurance policies,7 Savings and endowment insurance policies,8 Mutual 
funds, Bonds, Stocks, Options, Money lent to friends and family, and Other savings or 
investments. 
                                            
6
 These plans are a unique asset class, designed to encourage employees to participate in wealth accumulation 
(Alessie et al., 2000). They work as ‘save-as-you-earn’ deduction arrangements, automatically depositing a 
certain amount from individuals’ gross salaries in a separate savings account. 
7
 As a common form of defined contribution (DC) pension plan, these involve a one-time premium payment, 
which is tax deductible. Individuals who have taken out these plans report the amount of the guaranteed 
minimum final payment if their plans are still in effect.  
8
 As a form of life insurance, endowment insurance policies are known as ‘insured saving’, providing a lump 
sum at maturity rather than an annuity. Although premium payments are not tax deductible, the lump sum 
received at maturity is.  
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Equity is calculated as the sum of Individual company shares and Mutual funds9. Our 
main variable of interest is the weight of equity investment within a portfolio, which is 
comparable to the endowed capital allocated to risky gambles in experimental studies.  
In Panel C of Table 1, we present average equity ownership rates over our sample 
period. These rates are below 100% since individuals in our sample tend to exit and re-enter 
the equity market from time to time. Descriptive statistics for the overall equity portfolio 
weight, and for Shares and Mutual funds separately together with the average total annual 
return on the Dutch stock market index, AEX, are reported.  
To control for the credit constraints, which may influence investors’ investment 
capability (Cocco, 2004; Cocco, Gomes and Maenhout, 2005), we create a Debt Ratio 
variable equal to a ratio of individuals’ total debts to total assets. Total assets comprise 
financial assets and fixed assets including Real estate, Owners’ houses and the Cash value of 
insurance on real estate and owners’ houses. Debts include Negative current accounts 
balances, Private loans, Extended lines of credit, Debts with mail-order firms, Loans from 
family and friends, Student loans, Credit card debts, and Other debts, as well as Mortgages on 
real estate and owners’ houses.     
Measuring the Level of Myopia 
 
To define the level of myopia, we focus on two separate measures: portfolio 
evaluation frequency and rebalancing frequency. We ask investors about their evaluation and 
rebalancing frequencies by providing ‘daily’, ‘weekly’, ‘monthly’, ‘quarterly’, ‘annually’, and 
‘less often than annually’ options for both questions, following the ‘choice bracketing’ 
approach of Read, Loewenstein and Rabin (1999). The question on evaluation frequency is 
                                            
9
 We do not include Options or Bonds in the risky financial asset category, due to their distinctive characteristics, 
and the possibility of hedging. If individuals hold any put or call options, they report the total amounts paid for 
them on acquisition or the total market value when the option was written. Bonds are often considered riskless 
assets, and the DHS data does not distinguish between government and corporate bonds. Alessie et al. (2000) 
find that Bonds are an unpopular asset type in the Netherlands.  
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presented as: “How often do you evaluate the performance of your stock portfolio on average? 
An evaluation can take different forms. It can, for example, vary from including recent prices 
in a spread sheet to simply checking in newspapers or on Teletext10 how the shares perform.”  
The question on rebalancing frequency is presented as: “How often do you change 
your stock portfolio by buying or selling shares without the need for cash?”  
We follow the design of Gneezy and Potters (1997) in order to disentangle the effects 
of evaluation frequency from rebalancing frequency, adopting a 2-by-2 design where both 
frequencies are divided into two levels, High and Low. Similar approaches were also used by 
Langer and Weber (2008), and Fellner and Sutter (2009).  
Our survey results are presented in Table 2. We observe that individuals’ evaluation 
frequencies are spread evenly from ‘daily’ to ‘less often than annually’. 44% of individuals 
choose to evaluate their portfolio performance either monthly or more frequently. Such 
frequent evaluation exposes individuals to observing portfolio losses on a regular basis, which 
in turn may be detrimental to their propensity to invest in stocks and to their aggregate wealth. 
These results reflect the very strong preferences for frequent feedback identified in the 
experimental study of Fellner and Sutter (2009).  
[Table 2 here] 
In assessing rebalancing frequency, however, 70% of investors in our sample indicate 
that they rebalance their portfolios less often than annually. Investors opt for low rebalancing 
frequency, conflicting with the argument that investors generally prefer high rebalancing 
frequency (Fellner and Sutter, 2009), or over-trade due to overconfidence (Odean, 1999; 
Barber and Odean, 2000; 2001). Our results are consistent with those of Agnew, Balduzzi, 
and Sundén (2003), who find that individual investors in 401(k) Plans trade infrequently, with 
                                            
10
 Teletext is a data broadcasting service in which pre-programmed sequences of frames of data are broadcast 
cyclically. 
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over 87% of their sample maintaining their allocation for at least one year and, on average, 
rebalancing every 3.85 years.  
As expected, those investors who trade frequently are also more likely to evaluate 
their performance more often. The correlation between the evaluation and rebalancing 
frequency variables is positive and significant at the 0.1% level. However, these two variables 
are by no means perfect substitutes (the correlation coefficient is equal to 0.31).  We divide 
both variables into high and low at their median values. In the case of evaluation frequency, 
we allocate individuals from ‘daily’ to ‘monthly’ to High level (44%) and from ‘quarterly’ to 
‘less than annually’ to Low level (56%). In the case of rebalancing frequency, we define 
frequencies from ‘daily’ to ‘annually’ as High level (30%) and define frequency of ‘less than 
annually’ as Low level (70%).  
 Consequently, we categorise 400 individuals into four groups, which allows us to 
disentangle the two variables, and assess the effect of varying levels of myopia. We allocate 
70 individuals (17.5%) into the ‘High Evaluation with High Rebalancing frequency’ group 
(HEHR); 107 individuals (26.75%) into the ‘High Evaluation with Low Rebalancing 
frequency’ group (HELR); 50 individuals (12.5%) into the ‘Low Evaluation with High 
Rebalancing frequency’ group (LEHR); and 173 individuals (43.25%) into the ‘Low 
Evaluation with Low Rebalancing frequency’ group (LELR) as listed in Table 2.  
Measuring Individuals’ Loss Aversion Coefficients and Discount Rates 
 
During 1997-2002, the DHS included 16 hypothetical intertemporal choice questions 
developed by Tu (2004) based on experimental work by Thaler (1981) and Loewenstein 
(1988). The discounted utility (DU) model assumes that when comparing intertemporal 
choices, decision makers have a single discount rate for gains and losses, and for delaying and 
speeding-up payments. Thaler (1981) and Loewenstein (1988), however, contest the 
assumption that individuals’ self-determined discount rates vary in different situations, since 
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individuals demand a premium for delaying a sure payment which is greater than the cost 
incurred for speeding-up the same amount.  
In particular, individuals have different discount rates for gains and losses, and 
qualitatively different attitudes towards borrowing and lending (Loewenstein and Prelec, 
1992). This intertemporal choice model incorporates the loss aversion effects of individuals in 
terms of framing their gains and losses relative to their subjective discount rates. Loewenstein 
(1988) specifies three terms to define individuals’ preferences: the immediate consumption 
price, the delayed consumption price, and the speeding-up consumption price. The delayed 
premium cost is a compensation for delay as opposed to immediate consumption, and the 
speeding-up cost is a sacrifice made in order to advance delayed to immediate consumption.  
The sixteen questions developed by Tu (2004) differ by four components: delaying (D) 
vs. speeding-up (S) a payment; gains (G) vs. losses (L); a time dimension (T) of 3 months vs. 
1 year; and a payment (X) of ƒ 1,000 vs. ƒ 100,000 in Dutch guilders. The gains occur as a 
result of winning a prize in the National lottery, and the losses as a result of a tax assessment. 
The Delay of Gain questions, for example, ask an individual to state the required additional 
amount to compensate for postponing the prize of ƒ1,000 for one year. Questions on (1) 
‘Delay of a Gain’ and (2) ‘Speed-up of a loss’ with an amount of ƒ1,000 for a 1 year time 
dimension are presented as below. 
(1)  ‘Imagine that you win a prize of ƒ1,000 (€454) in the National Lottery. The 
prize is to be paid out today. Imagine, however, that the lottery asks if you are 
prepared to wait A YEAR before you get the prize (there is no risk involved in 
this wait). How much extra money would you ask to receive to compensate you 
for the waiting term of a year? If you agree on the waiting term without the 
need to receive extra money for that, please type 0 (zero) – AT LEAST a 
compensation of ƒ       .’ 
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(2)  ‘Imagine that you receive a tax assessment of ƒ1,000 (€454). The assessment has 
to be settled within A YEAR. It is, however, possible to settle the assessment now, 
and in that case you will get a REDUCTION. How much of a REDUCTION would 
you require to receive for settling the assessment now instead of after a year? If 
you are not interested in receiving a reduction for paying early or if you think 
there is no need to receive a reduction for paying early, please type 0 (zero) – AT 
LEAST a reduction of ƒ       .’ 
The Delay of Gain (DG) question (1) asks an individual to state the additional amount 
required to compensate her for postponing the prize of ƒ1,000 for one year. If the individual 
indicates ƒ200, this amount compensates for the waiting time of one year, and a final payment 
of ƒ1,200 would be made in this case. Similarly, the Speed-up of a Loss (SL) question (2) is 
framed to identify by how much an individual would expect to reduce their final payments by 
expediting the future payment. If the individual states ƒ200 to be his required reduction, the 
tax assessment will be reduced to ƒ800, to be paid immediately. From the answers to the 16 
questions, we winsorise extreme values and undertake a validity check for two types of 
judgment errors following the approach of Dimmock and Kouwenberg (2010). First, we 
discard respondents who answer zero to all questions each year as we assume that they did not 
fully consider the questions11. Second, we winsorise individuals’ responses to control for 
extreme values at X (ƒ1,000 or ƒ100,000) for the DG questions and at 50% of X for the other 
questions. We also compare the answers on the set of four questions for each situation in 
order to identify and discard any responses displaying judgment errors.  
                                            
11
 About 3% to 5% of observations are deleted due to individuals who answer zero to all questions each year. 
Although it is possible that those individuals are not loss averse and hold a zero discount rate, it is impossible to 
determine whether their responses do indeed reflect this or whether, alternatively, are simply due to a lack of 
interest in participating in the survey. Following the approach of Dimmock and Kouwenberg (2010), therefore, 
we discard them.  
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For instance, the four questions on the DG situation, vary with X amount of either 
ƒ1,000 or ƒ100,000  and a horizon T of either three months or one year. Thus if a respondent 
demands a greater amount as a premium for delaying a gain for 3 months rather than delaying 
for one year, for the same amount or, alternatively, if a respondent demands a greater amount 
as premium for delaying ƒ1,000 rather than ƒ100,000, for the same time period, we consider 
such anomalous responses to be judgment errors and discard them. Thaler (1981) and 
Loewenstein and Prelec (1992) emphasise that dynamic inconsistency of time-preferences 
affects intertemporal choices independently of loss aversion effects; thus we exclude 
questions with a time dimension of three months to avoid such discrepancies.  
[Table 3 here] 
Descriptive statistics for responses to the eight questions with a time dimension of one 
year are presented in Panel A of Table 3. Individuals in our sample demand the highest 
premium for the Delay of Gain (DG) questions as compared to all other situations. The mean 
value of 17.82% for the premium ratio indicates that individuals demand f178.2 on average as 
their premium for delaying a gain of ƒ1,000 for one year. For the delay of losses, on the other 
hand, individuals only expect to pay ƒ30.6 (or 3.06%) to delay a payment of ƒ1,000 for one 
year. They expect to incur lesser amounts to delay losses and speed-up gains, while requiring 
a high reduction from the speed-up of losses. These deviations violate the notions of 
conventional discounted utility (DU), which proposes the same discount rate for both 
borrowing and lending.  
From the calculated ratios for each of the intertemporal choice questions, we derive 
equations based on the full reference point adjustment model of Loewenstein (1988), which 
provides the most effective results according to the findings of Dimmock and Kouwenberg 
(2010). Using Generalized Methods of Moments (GMM) estimations to minimise the sum of 
the squared errors, we derive two parameters i.e. the loss aversion coefficient and discount 
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rate, from the eight moments situations. Descriptive statistics for the two parameters are 
presented in Panel B of Table 3. The loss aversion coefficient and discount rate are estimated 
for each individual based on their average responses over the period 1997-2002. When the 
two parameters are calculated, the GMM estimations report standard errors for each parameter 
and for each individual. Thus we also report descriptive statistics of standard errors from the 
estimations for the two parameters.   
85% of our investors have loss aversion coefficients greater than 1, which implies that 
they are loss averse (1 indicates that a loss or gain of the same value have an impact of the 
same magnitude on their utility). The mean (3.73) and median (1.93) values of the loss 
aversion coefficient indicate skewness to the right. The mean estimated annual discount rate is 
7.7%, and the median is 5.28%. By comparison, the estimations of Dimmock and 
Kouwenberg (2010), based on the full reference point adjustment model of Loewenstein 
(1988), give mean and median values for the loss aversion coefficients which are higher 
(mean 5.61; median 2.47), and estimated discount rates which are lower (mean 5%; median 
4%), than our estimations. Dimmock and Kouwenberg (2010) who use the same dataset, 
however, include all individuals in the panel rather than restricting their sample to investors 
only. Thus the differing results for the present study and for that of Dimmock and 
Kouwenberg (2010) suggest that investors have lower loss aversion coefficients and higher 
discount rates than the population as a whole. Our estimations are consistent with Tversky 
and Kahneman (1992) who find that individuals have a loss aversion coefficient of 2.25. We 
check whether loss aversion is highly correlated with both evaluation and rebalancing 
frequencies in order to rule out the possible selection effect of loss aversion on myopic 
behaviour. We find that correlations between loss aversion and myopia variables are rather 
weak. The correlation coefficient between loss aversion and evaluation frequency is 0.07. The 
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correlation coefficient between loss aversion and rebalancing frequency is greater at 0.33 but 
significant only at the 10% level. 
Other Psychological Variables  
 
We include questions enabling us to determine individuals’ subjective time 
preferences and reference points following the approach of Veld-Merkoulova (2011) as 
shown in Table 4.  
[Table 4 here] 
Investors’ time preferences indicate whether they are short-term or long-term oriented 
in planning for the future. Balduzzi and Lynch (1999) and Lynch and Balduzzi (2000) argue 
that long-term oriented investors are inclined to invest a greater proportion of their wealth in 
stocks than short-term oriented investors. We include a measure of investors’ time 
preferences in order to examine the independent effect of myopia. To measure investors’ time 
preference, we select a question from the DHS which identifies the extent to which 
individuals agree with a statement of “I often work on things that will only pay off in a couple 
of years”. Individuals choose an answer on a Likert scale from 1 (totally disagree) to 7 
(totally agree).  
Based on the median value, we divide individuals who respond on scales 1 to 3 into 
the short-term oriented group (43%) and those individuals who respond on scales 4 to 7 into 
the long-term oriented group (57%).   
In Table 4, we also present summary statistics for reference points (see detailed 
discussion in Veld and Veld-Merkoulova, 2008). The reference point to which an individual 
compares her investment returns is the most important element of the valuation stage of 
prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Tversky and Kahneman, 1992). Thaler et al. 
(1997) argue that the reference point strongly influences investors’ perceptions. When 
subjects perceive only positive returns from the market under conditions of high inflation, 
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they increase their investment in risky assets without realising that they are suffering from 
money illusion (Shafir, Diamond, and Tversky, 1997). We offer respondents a choice of 
reference points including the initial price paid, returns on a savings account, the market index 
return, and other benchmarks. 57% indicate that they check whether their investments have 
increased in value based on the price paid; around 30% compare with the returns on the 
savings account; only 8% consider whether their investments outperform market indices, such 
as the AEX in the Netherlands while 5% refer to other benchmarks. The number of 
individuals who choose the market index is unexpectedly low, while the majority select the 
initial price paid as their reference point, thus supporting Samuelson and Zeckhauser (1988) 
and Shefrin and Statman (1985).  
 
3. Empirical Results   
 
The Effects of MLA on the Investment Level 
 
We investigate the joint effects of myopia, loss aversion and control variables on the 
proportion of investors’ total financial assets invested in equities. We apply the following 
equation model (1) and estimate Prais-Winsten (1954) regressions with panel-corrected 
standard errors (PCSE), after carrying out a Woodridge (2002) test to detect autocorrelations 
in the disturbances12.   
,	 = 	α + x′β+	y′,	γ+ z′	δ+ ε,				            (1) 
(0, ) 
 
The dependent variable 	 denotes the observed proportion of equities in the 
total financial assets (in decimals) of individual i at time t (1997–2010). x′ 	is the vector of 
investors’ time-invariant characteristics including myopia variables, loss aversion, discount 
                                            
12
 Based on simulation results, Drukker (2003) further suggests that the autocorrelation test of Wooldridge (2002) 
has robust properties with regard to its size and power when the sample size is reasonable. 
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rates, time-preference, reference points, gender, marital status, education level, and 
employment status. y′
,	
	 is the vector of time-varying characteristics which includes age, 
financial assets, and debt ratio. z′	  is a vector of year dummies, which applies to all 
individuals. By including year dummies, we account for year specific effects such as macro-
economic conditions. 	ε,			 is a normally distributed error term which is corrected for the 
presence of arbitrary heteroskedasticity and serial correlation. Variable definitions are 
presented in Appendix A. 
We present five specifications of empirical model (1) in Table 5. Regression (1) is the 
base model that examines the relation between MLA and the levels of equity investment after 
controlling for other demographical and financial characteristics. Regression (2) includes the 
discount rate, regression (3) includes the time preference variable, and regression (4) is 
estimated by including reference points within regression (1). Finally, regression (5) includes 
all explanatory and control variables.  
[Table 5 here] 
We include the variables for myopia and loss aversion independently, as well as the 
interactions between them. To avoid the dummy variable trap, we omit HEHR (high 
evaluation frequency with high rebalancing frequency) as a reference category. When we 
consider the coefficient estimates for myopia variables alone, investors with a low level of 
rebalancing frequency (the HELR, and in particular, the LELR groups) invest significantly 
less than more myopic investors with a high rebalancing frequency (HEHR category). There 
is no significant difference between the varying levels of evaluation frequency given the same 
level of rebalancing frequency (LEHR compared to HEHR and LELR compared to HELR). It 
is particularly important for our purpose to identify whether or not the coefficients for loss 
aversion differ across groups with higher or lower evaluation and/or rebalancing frequencies.  
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For the HEHR group, higher loss aversion is associated with significantly lower equity 
investments (coefficient of –0.004). Taking into account interaction terms, we find that for all 
other investor groups, the loss aversion coefficient is not statistically significant. Thus 
investors with higher loss aversion hold a lower share of their wealth in stocks, but this 
applies only to investors who both evaluate and rebalance their portfolios frequently (HEHR 
group).  
To interpret our finding of the negative association between a combination of frequent 
evaluation/rebalancing and high loss aversion, on one hand, and low investment in equities, 
on the other hand, we note that using non-experimental data prevent us from unequivocally 
interpreting this result as a causal effect of MLA on equity investments. Instead, there are 
three different possible interpretations of such correlations: 1) support for the theoretical 
predictions of the Benartzi and Thaler (1995) model; 2) reverse causality; and 3) existence of 
some unobserved variables (for example, personality traits) responsible for both types of 
behaviour. Of these three alternatives, reverse causality (the feedback from equity investment 
holdings to the frequency of evaluation/rebalancing) seems to be the least plausible 
explanation for our results. Normally, we would expect that investors with higher levels of 
equity holdings would evaluate/rebalance their portfolios more often, which is contrary to the 
negative correlations that we find. However, we cannot rule out that, even after carefully 
controlling for all available demographic, financial and psychological variables, there might 
be some underlying, unobserved, variables (such as personality traits) that drive both MLA 
and the tendency to invest in stocks. For this reason, our finding that empirical evidence on 
MLA among individual investors is consistent with the theoretical predictions of Benartzi and 
Thaler (1995) should be interpreted in conjunction with experimental studies that are free 
from this problem.  
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With regard to the measurement of myopia, neither frequent evaluation of investment 
results nor frequent rebalancing taken separately appear to systematically increase the effect 
of loss aversion on investors’ portfolio holdings. For example, the differences between loss 
aversion effects for HEHR versus LEHR, and for HELR versus LELR groups are small and 
not statistically significant as shown by the Wald tests in Table 5. We conclude that it is the 
combination of rebalancing and evaluation frequencies which causes the MLA effect. Our 
results are consistent with the strong interaction effect between rebalancing and evaluation 
frequencies, as identified by Langer and Weber (2008) in a controlled experimental setting.  
We do not observe any specific effects from either investors’ discount rates or time 
preferences on their equity holdings. In particular, inclusion of these variables has no material 
influence on MLA. Considerable disparities are observed to arise from investors’ different 
reference points. As compared with those who choose market index as a reference point, 
investors who choose other reference points invest significantly less in stocks. Investors who 
compare their performance to the initial price paid have the lowest equity holding.  
In terms of our control variables, our results do not indicate a significant gender effect, 
supporting Haliassos and Bertaut (1995). We observe a positive relationship between age and 
equity investments, although only at the 10% significance level, with older investors holding 
a higher proportion of equity investments. Van Rooij et al. (2011) and Hurd (1990) point out 
that this may be due to the different mortality rates of richer and poorer households, i.e. rich 
people tend to live longer. Our results, however, are inconsistent with the life-cycle theory of 
Cocco et al. (2005) and more specifically, with their argument that the level of optimal 
investment in risky assets decreases with investors’ age. Given that, however, most Dutch 
investors are entitled to generous state pension (“AOW”) benefits as well as to mandatory 
supplementary occupational pension arrangements, older investors may be less averse to 
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holding risky portfolios. This may explain why such individuals hold a relatively higher 
proportion of equities than do younger Dutch investors.    
We observe significant and negative effects from the marital status of investors, 
similar to those identified by Barber and Odean (2000; 2001), although only at the 10% 
significance level. We observe a significant education effect; contrary to our a priori 
expectations, however, we observe that those investors with college or university degrees 
invest significantly smaller proportions of their financial portfolios in equities than do other 
investors. These results may indicate that individuals’ education levels are distinct from their 
levels of financial literacy as discussed in Van Rooij et al. (2011; 2012).  
Self-employed and retired individuals invest at significantly higher levels in stocks 
than individuals in regular employment. Our finding is consistent with Barsky et al. (1997), 
who argue that self-employed people are more risk tolerant and thus invest more in risky 
assets 13 . Self-employed individuals in the Netherlands can arrange individual pension 
provisions which supplement their state pension (AOW) benefits. Although such individuals 
can defer tax on the additional pension contributions made, they do not enjoy the benefit of 
employer contributions (Alessie et al. 2000). In addition, their uncertain personal income 
streams make it harder for them to contribute on a regular basis to pension plans. Therefore, 
self-employed individuals have a strong incentive to generate sufficient funds for retirement 
purposes. They may be more prepared to accept higher risk in the expectation of greater 
reward.14 
 The total amount of financial assets is not significantly related to proportion of equity 
investments. The effect of the debt ratio on the proportion of equity investment is, however, 
                                            
13
 Using US data, Heaton and Lucas (2000) argue that self-employed investors hold greater amounts of equity in 
their own businesses, but comparably little common stock. We exclude any equity holdings in self-employed 
individuals’ own businesses; thus our finding cannot be explained by the argument of Heaton and Lucas (2000). 
14
 Self-employed households and couples over 65 years old were also the wealthiest demographic groups in the 
Netherlands in 2009. More information is available at: http://www.cbs.nl/en-GB/menu/themas/inkomen-
bestedingen/publicaties/artikelen/archief/2010/2010-3011-wm.htm 
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positive and significant, possibly reflecting greater risk tolerance among more leveraged 
households. This finding is consistent with that of Heaton and Lucas (2000) who suggest that 
some stocks are indirectly financed by mortgage debt. Consequently, a higher mortgage is 
associated with higher stock holding. Correspondingly, Alessie et al. (2000) report that in 
1999, only 40% of new mortgages in the Netherlands were issued to purchase first homes, the 
rest were issued to individuals to invest in second homes, or to finance stock market 
operations.   
We observe significant year effects, which reflect high fluctuations in investors’ 
equity holdings over time. Taking 1997 as a reference year, we also measure the effect of the 
2008 financial crisis as presented in Table 5. Through comparing the average values of pre- 
and post-crisis time dummy variable coefficients, we observe that investors’ investment fell 
significantly after the crisis, based on the Wald test.  
The Effect of MLA on Changes in Investment Levels Over Time 
In this section we investigate the relationship between MLA and the yearly changes in 
the individual investors’ equity investment. In order to address dynamic effects, we control 
for the lagged changes in individuals’ equity holding. To this end, we develop a structural 
state dependence model which includes a lagged dependent variable.  
Changes in equity holding are also influenced by unobserved variables in our model, 
which would cause serial correlations if the initial conditions were unaccounted for. Thus we 
include as initial conditions in our model, individuals’ equity investment levels at the 
beginning of the observation period, as suggested by Wooldridge (2005).  
		∆,	 =	∆,	 + ,	 + 	x
′

β+	∆y ′
,	
γ	 + 	z′	δ + ε,						  (2) 
	(0,)			 
In equation (2) above,		∆	,	, the dependent variable (in decimals), denotes the 
changes in the equity portfolio weight of an individual i over time t (1997–2010). The 
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dependent variable has a minimum value of -1 and a maximum value of 1, while most 
observations are concentrated around zero. The lagged dependent variable,	∆,	, and 
initial investment level, 	,	, are included as covariates as discussed above. The rest of 
the variables are the same as in equation (1), and we also control for heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelations in the disturbances. We present five regression model specifications in Table 
6.  
[Table 6 here] 
For all specifications in Table 6, the lagged dependent variable is significantly and 
negatively correlated with the dependent variable while initial investment levels are 
significantly and positively correlated with it. The negative autocorrelation of the changes in 
investment level in equities reflects individual investors’ responses to volatile market changes 
during the sample period. Even if investors are aware that market returns exhibit the tendency 
of mean reversion, they may suffer from ‘gambler’s fallacy’ (Tversky and Kahneman, 1971). 
According to this notion, gamblers often bet on a fair chance, perceiving a random sequence 
as reflecting true probabilities. If the sequence consistently favours one direction, they expect 
the next will exhibit the opposite tendency, i.e. a random process will self-correct. Thus, 
investors make changes to their equity holdings in the direction opposite to that of the 
preceding change.  
Most of the other control variables either exhibit expected signs or have little effect on 
the changes in equity investment levels. Investor age has a negative relationship with changes 
in equity holdings. Although older investors hold higher proportion of equities, they reduce 
their holdings over time, supporting the life-cycle theory of Cocco et al. (2005). Marital status 
also plays a significantly positive role in the changes in equity holdings, supporting the 
argument of Agnew et al. (2003) that stock allocations should be higher for married investors 
since two earners within a household enable greater potential for diversification. We observe 
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no significant education effect. Those investors who select returns on the savings account as 
their reference point increase their level of equity investments to a greater extent (significant 
at the 10% level) than investors with a reference point of market return. Decreasing equity 
investments are exhibited by self-employed individuals as compared to regular employees. 
The equity portfolio weights tend to increase with investors’ financial assets, but not with 
their debt ratios. The significant Wald test statistics in Table 6, which compare the average 
values of pre- and post-crisis time dummy coefficients taking 1999 as a reference year, 
suggest that investors increased their equity holdings following the 2008 financial crisis.  
With regard to the effects of myopia, we observe that investors with low evaluation 
frequency increase their equity investments over time, as indicated by the difference in 
coefficients between HEHR and LELR, as well as between HELR and LELR (as shown by 
the significant Wald test statistics in Table 6). At the same time, coefficient estimates for 
either loss aversion or for the interaction between myopia and loss aversion are not 
statistically significant. Thus our results indicate that, regardless of their loss aversion, 
investors who evaluate their portfolios less frequently increase their equity investments over 
time. However, it appears that most of the MLA effect is already included on investment level, 
and that further changes in investors’ portfolio allocations are not associated with MLA.   
Redefining Investment Level Changes     
 
As Bilias, Georgarakos and Haliassos (2010) note, widespread portfolio inertia means 
that more than half of households do not trade stocks in their portfolios for extended periods 
of time. In many cases, investors do not actively rebalance their portfolios, but rather follow a 
passive buy-and-hold strategy. However, as the values of their equity holdings change due to 
market fluctuations, this automatically affects their investments. In order to avoid treating 
such changes as deliberate investment decisions, we control for the impact of market returns.  
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We test whether MLA is associated with the changes in equity holdings made by 
investors solely as a result of active trading, by excluding the changes made passively due to 
market movements. We estimate the following regression equation (3) which is the same as 
equation (2) except for the redefined dependent variable.  
 
		. ,	 =	.,	 + 	,	 + 	x
′

β+	∆y ′
,	
γ	 + 	z′	δ + ε,				 (3) 
.,	 =		,	 − ,	
∗
 
,	
∗ =		
Equity	(1 + r	)	
Equity	(1 + r	) + 	Other	Financial	Assets
				 
r	 = 	
AEXI		−	AEXI	
AEXI	
 
 
Firstly, we obtain yearly market returns r	 from the AEX Total Return Index, and then 
calculate investors’ ‘expected’ equity holdings (*) at time t through adjusting their 
investment levels at time t-1 by the market return of 		r	 . From the reported values of 
individuals’ equity holdings at time t, we subtract the estimated Equity* value at time t, to 
obtain the changes made by investors,		. ,	. If investors do not actively change their 
equity holdings, .,	  should equal zero, on average. We report five specifications of 
the regression model in Table 7.  
[Table 7 here] 
The coefficients for LEHR and LELR are all positive, and statistically significant. This 
suggests that changes in the equity investments are positively related to the low level of 
evaluation frequency, supporting our previous findings. Coefficients for loss aversion and its 
interactions with myopia remain not significantly different from zero. Our robustness check 
confirms that, regardless of loss aversion, infrequent evaluation positively affects investment 
level changes, supporting the findings of Bellemare et al. (2005). With regard to other control 
variables, most relationships are similar to those shown in Table 6. Thus we can confirm that 
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redefining the dependent variable by controlling for the impact of market return on the 
changes of investors’ equity holdings over time does not influence our results.  
 
4. Summary and Conclusions  
 
 
We investigate whether myopic loss aversion as defined by Benartzi and Thaler (1995) 
is correlated with individual investors’ portfolio allocation decisions. While MLA has been 
studied previously in a laboratory setting, our study is the first to examine the relationship 
between MLA and individual investment portfolios using real-life data. Following Langer and 
Weber (2008), we disentangle the effects of evaluation frequency from those of rebalancing 
frequency. The measures of myopia are combined with individuals’ loss aversion, which we 
estimate from their responses to the hypothetical intertemporal choice questions developed by 
Thaler (1981) and Loewenstein (1988).  
We observe that the combination of high rebalancing frequency with loss aversion has 
significant negative correlation with individuals’ equity investments. While establishing 
causality is difficult for the actual investment data, this result is consistent with the main 
prediction of the MLA theory of Benartzi and Thaler (1995). Among highly loss averse 
individuals, only those, who both evaluate and rebalance their portfolios frequently, invest 
relatively little in equities. This result supports the experimental findings of Langer and 
Weber (2008) on the interaction between portfolio evaluation and rebalancing. When we 
further investigate changes in investors’ investments in stocks over time, infrequent portfolio 
evaluation is associated with an increase in their equity holdings, but loss aversion has no 
effect. This result is robust to controlling for the impact of market returns on individuals’ 
asset values. 
Overall, we find that the widespread existence of MLA is associated with the financial 
decision-making of individuals. Those investors, who are highly loss averse and frequently 
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evaluate investment performance and rebalance investment portfolios, tend to have low equity 
holdings in their financial portfolios, which is likely to lead to utility losses over investors’ 
lifetimes. However, once individuals establish their portfolio allocations according to their 
levels of both loss aversion and myopia, myopic loss aversion is no longer associated with 
further decreases in their levels of equity investments. Our results support the suggestion that 
long-term investment vehicles (such as defined contribution pension funds) should offer 
default asset allocations with higher proportions of equities in order to provide potential for 
more gains from the market participation across a broader range of investors.  
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Table 1 Sampling Process and Demographic Background 
 
Panel A - Sampling Process 
 
The following table presents the sampling process of this study.  
 
 Remained Lost  
Total number of individuals contacted on behalf of our survey   2,226 - 
Individuals who were able to answer investment related questions in our survey   687 1,539 
After merging the dataset with the hypothetical intertemporal questions  407 280 
After merging the dataset with the time preference question  403 4 
After merging the dataset  with questions on assets and liabilities  400 3 
 
 
Panel B - Demographic Background of Individual Investors 
 
The following table presents the demographic backgrounds of 400 individuals in our sample. 
 
Gender Men 68.3%  Education  Secondary Education  43.3% 
 Women 31.8%   College or University 56.8% 
       
Marital status Single 20.5%  Occupation  Regular employment  54.8% 
 Married 79.5%   Self-employed 12.8% 
     Retired 24.5% 
Age 30s and Less 20.3%   Others 8% 
 40s 26%     
 50s 21.3%     
 60s 17.5%     
 70s and more 15%     
 
 
Panel C - Financial Information  
 
The following table presents the ownership rate, defined as the percentage of individuals who hold 
equities, and descriptive statistics of the proportion of equity holdings from individuals’ total financial 
assets, and its breakdown between shares and mutual funds. The AEX index total return is the average 
annual return over the sample period, including reinvested dividends.  
 
 
Stats. Ownership % Equities % Mutual funds % Share % AEX 
Return 
 
Mean 59.39% 23.38% 59.78% 39.18% 8.45% 
 Median  6.95% 85.39% 12.19%  
N = 3347  Std. Dev  29.68% 43.94% 43.55%  
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Table 2 Measuring the Level of Myopia 
 
Evaluation Frequency  
How often do you evaluate the performance of your stock portfolio on average? An evaluation can 
take different forms. It can, for example, vary from including recent prices in a spreadsheet to simply 
checking in newspapers or on teletext how the shares perform.  
 
Frequency Daily Weekly Monthly Quarterly Annually Less often Total 
N 
(%) 
52 
(13 %) 
62 
(15.5%) 
63 
(15.8%) 
87 
(21.8%) 
87 
(21.8%) 
49 
(12.3%) 
400 
(100%) 
 High Level (44%) Low Level (56%)  
 
Rebalancing Frequency  
How often do you change your stock portfolio by buying or selling shares without the need for cash? 
 
Frequency Daily Weekly Monthly Quarterly Annually Less often Total 
N  
(%) 
1 
(0.3%) 
6 
(1.5%) 
21 
(5.3%) 
38 
(9.5%) 
54 
(13.5%) 
280 
(70%) 
400 
(100%) 
 High Level (30%) Low Level (70%)  
 
Groupings by the level of Myopia  
 
 Frequency Per cent 
HEHR (High Evaluation with High Rebalancing frequency) 70 17.5% 
HELR (High Evaluation with Low Rebalancing frequency) 107 26.8% 
LEHR (Low Evaluation with High Rebalancing frequency) 50 12.5% 
LELR  (Low Evaluation with Low Rebalancing frequency) 173 43.3% 
Total  400 100% 
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Table 3 Measuring Loss Aversion Coefficients and Discount Rates 
 
Panel A - Intertemporal Choice Questions  
 
Descriptive statistics for eight hypothetical intertemporal decision questions of 400 individuals are 
presented below. These questions specify delaying vs. speeding-up a payment; gains vs. losses; 
payment size of ƒ 1000 vs. ƒ 100,000 in Dutch guilders with a time dimension of one year. The gains 
are from winning a prize in the National lottery situation and the losses are from a tax assessment. The 
delayed premium cost is a compensation for the delayed consumption compared to the immediate 
consumption, and the speeding-up cost is a sacrifice to advance the delayed consumption to immediate 
consumption.  
 
 
Questions Mean  Median Std. Dev Min Max 
% of Premium for Delay of Gain, ƒ1,000  17.82% 11.11% 17.012% 0% 100% 
% of Premium for Delay of Gain, ƒ100,000 12.99% 7.94% 14.20% 0% 97% 
% of Cost for Delay of Loss, ƒ1,000 3.06% 1.80% 4.418% 0% 27% 
% of Cost for Delay of Loss, ƒ100,000  2.59% 1.74% 3.452% 0% 22% 
% of Sacrifice to Speed up of Gain, ƒ1,000  4.02% 1.58% 7.803% 0% 50% 
% of Sacrifice to Speed up of Gain, ƒ100,000  3.91% 1.76% 7.012% 0% 47% 
% of Reduction by Speed up of Loss, ƒ1,000 9.59% 7.96% 7.394% 0% 47% 
% of Reduction by Speed up of Loss, ƒ100,000 7.33% 5.40% 6.779% 0% 44% 
      
 
Panel B - Estimation results of Loss-Aversion Coefficient and Discount Rate  
 
Parameters Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max 
Loss Aversion Coefficient 3.73 1.93 6.45 0.10 40.00 
S.E. of Loss-Aversion  2.14 0.42 8.89 0.00 139.66 
Discount Rate 7.7% 5.28% 7.00% 0.00% 100% 
S.E. of Discount Rate 2.24% 1.36% 2.99% 0.00% 1.80% 
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Table 4 Questions on Other Psychological Variables 
 
Time Preference  
Do you agree with the statement?  
“I often work on things that will only pay off in a couple of years”. 
 Strongly disagree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Strongly agree 
7 Total 
N  
(%) 
17  
(6.4%) 
41  
(15.5%) 
53 
(20%) 
51  
(19.2%) 
69  
(26%) 
25 
(9.4%) 
9  
(3.4%) 
400 
(100%) 
 
Reference Point  
When you evaluate the performance of your stock investments (including stocks in investment funds), 
what is your relevant benchmark?  
 
Categories The price paid Savings account AEX index Other Total 
N  
(%) 
227  
(56.8%) 
118  
(29.5%) 
34  
(8.5%) 
21  
(5.2%) 
400  
(100%) 
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Table 5 The Effect of MLA on the Investment Level  
The following table presents the results of Prais-Winsten regression of panel-corrected standard error (PCSE) estimates accounting for both heteroskedasticity 
and serial correlation of the disturbances. The dependent variable is the portfolio equity weight of an individual (in decimals). In our unbalanced panel, the 
total number of observations of non-zero risky financial assets is 1986 from 340 investors. Corrected z–statistics are in parentheses and the significance levels 
are denoted by asterisks, *** 1%, ** 5%, and * 10% (p-values are two-tailed). 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Equity Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z 
HELR -0.053** (-1.93) -0.053** (-1.93) -0.057** (-2.08) -0.053* (-1.91) -0.056** (-2.03) 
LEHR  0.006 (0.16)  0.005  (0.13)  0.006  (0.15)  0.007 (0.20)  0.006 (0.16) 
LELR -0.080*** (-3.09) -0.080*** (-3.07) -0.083*** (-3.18) -0.074*** (-2.79) -0.076*** (-2.84) 
Loss Aversion (LA) -0.004** (-2.12) -0.004** (-1.93) -0.004** (-2.10) -0.004** (-2.21) -0.004** (-1.99) 
HELR*LA  0.006** (1.98)  0.005*  (1.80)  0.006**  (2.06)  0.006**  (2.15)  0.006** (1.99) 
LEHR* LA  0.001 (0.09)  0.001  (0.12)  0.000  (0.06)  0.002  (0.21)  0.002 (0.22) 
LELR* LA  0.006** (2.33)  0.006**  (2.10)  0.006**  (2.31)  0.006**  (2.41)  0.006** (2.15) 
Discount Rate 
  
-0.076 (-0.65) 
    
-0.092 (-0.79) 
Time Preference 
    
-0.016 (-0.96)
  
-0.013 (-0.76) 
Reference Points: Initial Price 
      
-0.077*** (-2.50) -0.076*** (-2.49) 
Reference Points: Savings account 
      
-0.076** (-2.36) -0.073** (-2.24) 
Reference Points: Others 
      
-0.076 (-1.46) -0.074 (-1.42) 
Gender (Men) 0.008  (0.36) 0.008 ( 0.36) 0.008  (0.38)  0.011  (0.48)  0.010 (0.47) 
Age  0.002*  (1.73)  0.002*  (1.75)  0.002*  (1.79)  0.002  (1.54)  0.002 (1.61) 
Marriage -0.035* (-1.69) -0.034* (-1.66) -0.033 (-1.60) -0.036* (-1.77) -0.035* (-1.68) 
Education   -0.033* (-1.82) -0.032* (-1.80) -0.035* (-1.91) -0.035** (-1.93) -0.036** (-1.98) 
Occupation: Self-employed  0.135*** ( 4.16)  0.134***  (4.14)  0.134***  (4.15)  0.141***  (4.38)  0.139*** (4.34) 
Occupation: Retired  0.093***  (3.15)  0.091***  (3.07)  0.093***  (3.14)  0.092***  (3.13)  0.089*** (3.04) 
Occupation: Others  0.030  (0.91)  0.029  (0.88)  0.033  (1.00)  0.025  (0.76)  0.026 (0.79) 
Financial Assets  0.004  (0.63)  0.004  (0.61)  0.004  (0.62)  0.003  (0.50)  0.003 (0.47) 
Debt ratio   0.013**  (1.98)  0.013**  (2.00)  0.013**  (1.98)  0.013**  (1.98)  0.013** (2.02) 
Year Effect Significant Significant Significant Significant Significant 
Constant  0.406*** (7.16)  0.410***  (7.22)  0.413***  (7.25)  0.484***  (7.63)  0.494***    (7.75) 
AR(1) Rho 0.637 0.638 0.637 0.637 0.636 
R-Squared 0.215 0.215 0.215 0.218 0.218 
Wald Test  Chi2(1) Prob. Chi2(1) Prob. Chi2(1) Prob. Chi2(1) Prob. Chi2(1) Prob. 
HEHR*LA=LEHR*LA    0.01  0.928    0.02  0.902    0.00  0.953  0.04  0.835  0.05 0.828 
HELR*LA=LELR*LA    0.02  0.889    0.02  0.897    0.00  0.962  0.00  0.953  0.00 0.995 
HEHR*LA=HELR*LA    3.93**  0.047    3.25*  0.071    4.22**  0.040  4.63**  0.031  3.97** 0.046 
LEHR*LA=LELR*LA    0.45  0.501    0.33  0.565    0.49  0.483  0.33  0.563  0.25 0.618 
HEHR*LA=LELR*LA    5.44***  0.019    4.42**  0.036    5.33**  0.021  5.81**  0.016  4.61** 0.032 
Effect of the Crisis   19.88***  0.000  19.89***  0.000  19.59***  0.000  19.19***  0.000  19.02*** 0.00 
Mean y1998-y2007 -0.061 -0.061 -0.061 -0.062 -0.061 
Mean y2008-y2010  -0.137 -0.136 -0.136 -0.136 -0.135 
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Table 6 The Effect of MLA on the Changes in Investment Level   
The following table presents the results of Prais-Winsten regression of panel-corrected standard error (PCSE) estimates accounting for both heteroskedasticity 
and serial correlation of the disturbances. The dependent variable (in decimals) is the change in the equity holding of an individual. In our unbalanced panel, 
including the lagged dependent variable, the total number of observations including zero and non-zero risky financial assets is 2147 from 347 individuals. 
Corrected z–statistics are in parentheses and the significance levels are denoted by asterisks, *** 1%, ** 5%, and * 10% (p-values are two-tailed). 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 ∆Equity Coef. Z Coef. Z Coef. Z Coef. Z Coef. Z 
Lag ∆Equity -0.434*** (-19.93) -0.435*** (-20.01) -0.435*** (-19.97) -0.434*** (-19.94) -0.435*** (-20.04) 
Equity  0.458*** (21.85)  0.462*** (21.95)  0.460*** (22.03)  0.461*** (21.89)  0.466*** (22.10) 
HELR  0.030* (1.77)  0.030* (1.77)  0.028 (1.61)  0.033* (1.91)  0.031* (1.78) 
LEHR  0.032 (1.56)  0.032 (1.53)  0.032 (1.54)  0.034* (1.63)  0.033 (1.59) 
LELR  0.068*** (4.32)  0.068*** (4.30)  0.065*** (4.06)  0.068*** (4.33)  0.065*** (4.06) 
Loss Aversion (LA)   0.000 (0.09)  0.000 (-0.20)  0.000 (0.09)  0.000 (0.17)  0.000 (-0.12) 
HELR* LA -0.002 (-0.71) -0.001 (-0.32) -0.001 (-0.67) -0.002 (-0.87) -0.001 (-0.46) 
LEHR* LA  0.002 (1.03)  0.003 (1.18)  0.002 (0.88)  0.002 (1.06)  0.003 (1.05) 
LELR* LA -0.002 (-0.93) -0.001 (-0.51) -0.002 (-0.92) -0.002 (-0.95) -0.001 (-0.53) 
Discount Rate 
  
 0.140** (2.44)          0.134** (2.33) 
Time Preferences  
  
    -0.013 (-1.39)     -0.013 (-1.33) 
Reference Points: Initial Price 
  
         0.024 (1.37)  0.024 (1.40) 
Reference Points: Savings account 
  
         0.030* (1.63)  0.032* (1.73) 
Reference Points: Others 
  
         0.010 (0.40)  0.015 (0.57) 
Gender (Men) -0.027** (-2.44) -0.025** (-2.27) -0.028*** (-2.48) -0.028*** (-2.48) -0.026** (-2.34) 
Age -0.002*** (-3.42) -0.002*** (-3.54) -0.002*** (-3.31) -0.002*** (-3.33) -0.002*** (-3.34) 
Marriage  0.032*** (2.93)  0.031*** (2.86)  0.033*** (3.06)  0.030*** (2.76)  0.030*** (2.78) 
Education    0.000 (-0.04) -0.002 (-0.18)  0.000 (-0.04)  0.000 (-0.04) -0.002 (-0.21) 
Occupation: Self-employed -0.045** (-2.18) -0.043** (-2.08) -0.047** (-2.24) -0.047** (-2.28) -0.047** (-2.24) 
Occupation: Retired -0.012 (-0.77) -0.010 (-0.59) -0.013 (-0.77) -0.014 (-0.86) -0.011 (-0.68) 
Occupation: Others  0.006 (0.37)  0.008 (0.54)  0.007 (0.43)  0.006 (0.37)  0.009 (0.59) 
∆ Financial Assets  0.019*** (2.86)  0.019*** (2.86)  0.019*** (2.83)  0.019*** (2.84)  0.018*** (2.82) 
∆ Debt ratio -0.002 (-0.75) -0.002 (-0.72) -0.002 (-0.72) -0.002 (-0.75) -0.002 (-0.70) 
Year Effect Significant Significant Significant Significant Significant 
Constant -0.057* (-1.73) -0.066** (-2.00) -0.052 (-1.57) -0.083** (-2.24) -0.087** (-2.35) 
AR(1) Rho 0.321 0.323 0.322 0.321 0.323 
R-Squared 0.443 0.445 0.444 0.444 0.447 
Wald Test  Chi2(1) Prob. Chi2(1) Prob. Chi2(1) Prob. Chi2(1) Prob. Chi2(1) Prob. 
HELR=LELR   7.88*** 0.005   7.89*** 0.005   7.59*** 0.006   6.79*** 0.009   6.32*** 0.001 
LEHR=LELR   3.79** 0.051   3.85** 0.050   3.18* 0.074   3.57* 0.059   2.99* 0.084 
Effect of the Crisis  11.56*** 0.001 11.34*** 0.001 11.74*** 0.001 11.66*** 0.001 11.61*** 0.001 
Mean y2000-y2007 -0.010 -0.010 -0.009 -0.009 -0.009 
Mean y2008-y2010  0.023 0.022 0.024 0.024 0.024 
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Table 7 The Effect of MLA on the Discretionary Changes in Investments  
The following table presents the results of Prais-Winsten regression of panel-corrected standard error (PCSE) estimates accounting for both heteroskedasticity 
and serial correlation of the disturbances. The dependent variable is the change in the equity holding of an individual, corrected for the market return over the 
period. In our unbalanced panel, including the lagged dependent variable, the total number of observations including zero and non-zero risky financial assets is 
2147 from 347 individuals. Corrected z–statistics are in parentheses and the significance levels are denoted by asterisks, *** 1%, ** 5%, and * 10% (p-values 
are two-tailed). 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
D. Equity Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z 
Lag D. Equity -0.430*** (-19.24) -0.430*** (-19.29) -0.429*** (-19.23) -0.430*** (-19.32) -0.430*** (-19.38) 
Equity  0.421*** (20.76)  0.424*** (20.82)  0.422*** (20.88)  0.426*** (20.87)  0.429*** (21.03) 
HELR  0.026 (1.58)  0.026 (1.57)  0.024 (1.45)  0.029* (1.75)  0.027* (1.63) 
LEHR  0.034* (1.76)  0.034* (1.74)  0.034* (1.75)  0.036* (1.84)  0.035* (1.80) 
LELR  0.062*** (4.08)  0.061*** (4.07)  0.059*** (3.85)  0.062*** (4.11)  0.059*** (3.86) 
Loss Aversion (LA)  0.000 (0.06)  0.000 (-0.18)  0.000 (0.06)  0.000 (0.13)  0.000 (-0.10) 
HELR* LA -0.002 (-0.70) -0.001 (-0.36) -0.002 (-0.67) -0.002 (-0.87) -0.001 (-0.52) 
LEHR* LA  0.001 (0.32)  0.001 (0.46)  0.000 (0.21)  0.001 (0.36)  0.001 (0.39) 
LELR* LA -0.002 (-0.86) -0.001 (-0.51) -0.002 (-0.85) -0.002 (-0.88) -0.001 (-0.52) 
Discount Rate      0.120** (2.16)          0.115** (2.06) 
Time Preferences          -0.011 (-1.21)     -0.011 (-1.17) 
Reference Points: Initial Price              0.025 (1.47)  0.025 (1.49) 
Reference Points: Savings account              0.032* (1.81)  0.034* (1.90) 
Reference Points: Others              0.013 (0.52)  0.016 (0.68) 
Gender (Men) -0.025** (-2.41) -0.024** (-2.26) -0.026*** (-2.45) -0.026*** (-2.46) -0.025** (-2.33) 
Age -0.002*** (-3.26) -0.002*** (-3.37) -0.001*** (-3.16) -0.001*** (-3.17) -0.002*** (-3.18) 
Marriage  0.029*** (2.81)  0.028*** (2.74)  0.030*** (2.91)  0.027*** (2.61)  0.027*** (2.63) 
Education   -0.002 (-0.21) -0.003 (-0.34) -0.002 (-0.21) -0.002 (-0.24) -0.004 (-0.39) 
Occupation: Self-employed -0.040** (-2.05) -0.039** (-1.96) -0.041** (-2.09) -0.043** (-2.16) -0.042** (-2.12) 
Occupation: Retired -0.013 (-0.82) -0.010 (-0.65) -0.013 (-0.82) -0.014 (-0.92) -0.012 (-0.75) 
Occupation: Others  0.007 (0.46)  0.009 (0.61)  0.007 (0.50)  0.007 (0.45)  0.010 (0.65) 
∆ Financial Assets  0.021*** (3.10)  0.021*** (3.11)  0.020*** (3.08)  0.020*** (3.08)  0.020*** (3.07) 
∆ Debt ratio  0.000 (-0.15)  0.000 (-0.14)  0.000 (-0.13)  0.000 (-0.15)  0.000 (-0.13) 
Year Effect Significant Significant Significant Significant Significant 
Constant -0.090*** (-2.83) -0.098*** (-3.06) -0.085*** (-2.69) -0.117*** (-3.28) -0.121*** (-3.35) 
AR(1) Rho 0.284 0.284 0.283 0.286 0.280 
R-Squared 0.148 0.419 0.418 0.420 0.421 
Wald Test  Chi2(1) Prob. Chi2(1) Prob. Chi2(1) Prob. Chi2(1) Prob. Chi2(1) Prob. 
HELR=LELR 7.75*** 0.005 7.75*** 0.005 7.45*** 0.006 6.49*** 0.011 6.06** 0.014 
LEHR=LELR 2.47 0.116 2.50 0.114 2.01 0.157 2.28 0.131 1.81 0.179 
Effect of the Crisis  21.22*** 0.000 20.97*** 0.000 21.42*** 0.000 21.41*** 0.000 21.35*** 0.000 
Mean y2000-y2007 0.026 0.025 0.026 0.027 0.027 
Mean y2008-y2010  0.069 0.069 0.070 0.071 0.070 
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Appendix A: Variable Definitions 
 
 
Dependent variables: 
 
Equity: The proportion of the financial assets invested in equities. 
∆Equity: The year-on-year change in Equity, measured in decimal. 
D.Equity: The net year-on-year change in Equity, corrected for the impact of the market return.  
 
Explanatory variables: 
 
Level of Myopia = 
HEHR: high evaluation and high rebalancing frequencies; omitted as a reference category 
HELR: high evaluation and low rebalancing frequencies = 1, if yes; 0, if no.  
LEHR: low evaluation and high rebalancing frequencies = 1, if yes; 0, if no.  
LELR: low evaluation and low rebalancing frequencies = 1, if yes; 0, if no. 
 
Loss Aversion (LA) = coefficient of loss aversion estimated using the procedure described in 
Dimmock and Kouwenberg (2010).  
 
Discount Rate = coefficient of discount rate estimated using the procedure described in Dimmock and 
Kouwenberg (2010). 
 
Level of Time preference = 1, for long-term; 0 if short-term.   
 
Reference Points = Looking at initial investment price = 1, if yes; 0, if no. 
                               Looking at return on savings account = 1, if yes; 0, if no. 
                               Looking at market return (Omitted as a reference category) 
                               Looking at other reference points = 1, if yes; 0, if no. 
 
Gender = 1, if male; 0 if female.  
 
Age = Actual age 
 
Marriage Status = 1, if married; 0 if single.  
 
Education = 1, if university or college graduate; 0 if below.  
 
Occupation =  Regular employment; omitted as a reference category 
                        Self-employed = 1, if yes; 0, if no. 
                        Retired = 1, if yes; 0, if no. 
                        Others = 1, if yes; 0, if no. 
 
Financial Assets = Total Financial Assets in €/100,000  
 
Debt Ratio = Total Debts/Total Assets 
 
